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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff-appellant, Erkan Ereren, submits this Brief in reply to the Brief 
of defendant-appellee, Snowbird Corporation. Dr. Ereren stands by his legal 
analysis, and its application to the instant dispute, set forth in his Opening 
Brief. He incorporates and seeks to refrain from unnecessarily repeating the 
factual and record history, and the arguments, regarding the accuracy and 
correctness of which he remains confident, that appear in that Opening Brief. 
Dr. Ereren seeks, by this Reply Brief, to point out inaccuracies that 
appear in Snowbird's Brief and flaws of Snowbird's legal analysis, and to 
reiterate his position that this Court should reverse and remand for new trial. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. SNOWBIRD HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY COUNTERED, 
BECAUSE IT CANNOT, DR. EREREN'S CONTENTION THAT HE 
IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BY REASON OF JUDGE 
WILKINSON' DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO COMPEL. 
As explained at pages 8-11 and 16-23 of his Opening Brief, Dr. Ereren 
(who diligently sought and, according to the jury's verdict, needed 
corroboration of his account1 of the subject incident) attempted to discover the 
identity of the ski instructor and the identities of "Dr. Scott" and his wife. 
Snowbird refused, in the face of the liberal language of Rule 26(b)(1), to provide 
information "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence/' Judge Wilkinson erroneously and in the abuse of whatever 
1
 Dr. Ereren gave consistent, detailed accounts of the events of the day of the subject incident 
in his deposition (e.g., R. 1415, Tr. 27-57; 88-92) and at trial (e.g., R. 1412, Tr. 445-50; 451-
68). 
discretion he had, and without affording Dr. Ereren an opportunity for hearing, 
accepted Snowbird's position in its entirety. As explained in Dr. Ereren's 
Opening Brief, at 16-18, the information provided by Snowbird, a party which 
devised and had Judge Wilkinson enforce its own ground rules for what 
Dr. Ereren could and could not discover in this litigation, were incomplete and 
unsatisfactory. 
Contrary to Snowbird's position, the Rules really do require parties to 
provide information and documentation reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. This is true even in situations like this, 
where one might surmise that Dr. Ereren, if he had a perfect memory, would 
have recalled the exact name of his Snowbird ski instructor and, if he had been 
a more curious sharer of the Snowbird experience, might have learned and 
kept the full name and address of "Dr. Scott" and his wife. It was not 
incumbent on Dr. Ereren to accept, on blind faith, Snowbird's limited recitation 
of the identities of ski instructors who might fit the bill. This is especially true 
because, as explained in Dr. Ereren's Opening Brief at 17, the Snowbird ski 
school director acknowledged (R. 1412, Tr. 375-76), contrary to what is set 
forth in Snowbird's Brief in the first paragraph of page 18, that the daily logs, 
purporting to show the names of all ski instructors who taught on a given day, 
are not necessarily completely accurate. Also unsatisfactory was the fact that 
Snowbird produced a photo array of only 42 of its probably more than 75 
female instructors (R. 1411, Tr. 231) from which, according to "Snowbird's 
Rules of Discovery," Dr. Ereren was required to attempt to select his 
2 
instructor.2 Given the size of this lawsuit (Dr. Ereren's evidence (R. 1413, Tr. 
699) was that his loss of income and earning capacity alone was of a value in 
excess of $4.5 million), if Snowbird had produced the names and addresses of 
all of its female ski instructors, Dr. Ereren would have had and taken the 
opportunity to determine for himself, rather than having Snowbird lay down 
the law for him regarding the universe of his choices, who the ski instructor in 
question actually was. That opportunity was, by reason of Snowbird's 
objection and Judge Wilkinson's ruling, not afforded him. 
Similarly, despite his own valiant efforts3 to locate "Dr. Scott" and his 
wife, Dr. Ereren was unable to locate corroborative testimony from skiers in his 
class. Snowbird's response to the discovery requests having to do with 
Dr. Ereren's attempt to locate "Dr. Scott" is understandable, from an 
adversarial perspective. Snowbird certainly did not want Dr. Ereren to discover 
corroborating evidence. But Snowbird's objections to Dr. Ereren's legitimate 
and critical discovery requests had no basis in law. 
Snowbird does not even attempt to counter, because it cannot, the 
proposition that, under Askew v. Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258, 1262-63 (Utah 
App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 918 P.2d 459 (Utah 1996), a trial judge's 
error in refusing to compel discovery is presumed prejudicial error or that, 
2
 It may also be important for the Court to keep in mind that absent from Snowbird's 
explanation, and as was explained in Dr. Ereren's Opening Brief at footnote 1 (p. 9), is the fact 
that Dr. Ereren agreed to limit his request for the identity of ski instructors to only female ski 
instructors. 
3
 A review of Dr. Ereren's testimony on this subject, R. 1412, Tr. 446-49, shows that his efforts 
were anything other than "half-hearted," as Snowbird has, at page 19 of its Brief, characterized 
them. 
3 
given the central importance of the lack of corroborating evidence of 
Dr. Ereren's account of what occurred, Snowbird is unable to overcome that 
presumption. Snowbird relies, as it must, entirely on the proposition that it 
was not error for Judge Wilkinson to rule as he did and that he did not abuse 
his discretion in ruling as he did. 
In support of its contention that Judge Wilkinson ruled correctly, 
Snowbird relies on Pack v. Case, 2001 UT. App. 232. That case is different 
from this case in several important particulars. First, there is no indication, in 
the Pack opinion, that the party seeking discovery needed information and 
documentation, from the party opposing discovery, to corroborate the seeking 
party's version of the facts. Also, it is patent that Snowbird would have 
objected to any deposition-conducted inquiry of the employees Snowbird 
allowed Dr. Ereren to depose regarding the names and addresses of ski 
instructors, people who took skiing lessons, physicians, and Florida residents. 
Also, and in any event, among the witnesses who Snowbird deigned to allow to 
be deposed, none would conceivably have known the names of all of the ski 
instructors, all of the persons who took ski lessons in the relevant time period, 
or all physicians or residents of Florida who stayed at Snowbird during the 
relevant time period.4 Also, with respect to the notion that Dr. Ereren had to 
renew his Motion to Compel after taking depositions, motions to reconsider 
(which is essentially what that would have been) are disfavored by the courts, 
4
 Nor would any individual likely have had the requested information at his or her fingertips. 
By their nature the subject discovery requests required corporate information gathering and 
review of documents. 
4 
and it is generally considered to be inappropriate for issues to be revisited with 
the same judge, let alone asking a new judge, like Judge Livingston, to reverse 
a ruling of a former judge, like Judge Wilkinson. Also, unlike the situation in 
Pack, where this Court ruled that a request to provide the names of all the 
persons who participated in the construction of a house was overly broad and 
unduly burdensome because many workers participated in the construction of 
the house, in this situation it was only the identities of one ski instructor and 
two other eyewitnesses ("Dr. Scott" and his wife) that were being sought. The 
problem was with determining the identity of those persons. Also unlike the 
situation in Pack (see paragraph 32 of that opinion regarding helpful blueprints 
obtainable from Salt Lake City), Dr. Ereren was in a spot where he needed 
information that only Snowbird possessed. Also, this Court in Pack stated that 
workers involved in the construction of the house would not have set foot upon 
the roof of the house and would not have any knowledge of the work conducted 
on the roof and that therefore "these employees could not provide information 
relevant to the present case." 2001 UT App. 232, U 31 (emphasis added). That 
is certainly not the case with respect to the persons the identities of whom 
Dr. Ereren was seeking. 
Dr. Ereren trusts that the foregoing explanation has shown that, 
although Snowbird's citation of Pack has some superficial appeal, when the 
issues of this case, particularly Dr. Ereren's need for corroboration, are 
understood, the Pack case will be deemed not to be of determinative 
significance. The inquiry should come back to the basic idea that parties are 
5 
expected to comply with discovery requests and trial courts are expected to 
order non-compliant parties to comply. It was inappropriate for Snowbird to 
take the position that the ground rules of discovery would be set by Snowbird. 
And it was error for Judge Wilkinson to put his stamp of approval on that 
procedure. 
Snowbird makes much of the fact that it produced lots of documents and 
information. That means very little. It is an all too common practice of some 
litigants to provide information and documentation in such volume that it 
serves as a smokescreen for the non-divulging of significant information and 
documentation that an opposing litigant really wants to obtain. This Court 
should not be buffaloed by Snowbird's implicit suggestion that it provided so 
many things in discovery that it did not have to provide things that Dr. Ereren 
really wanted and needed. 
Also, the Court should understand that, lest it succumb to Snowbird's 
efforts to persuade the Court that Dr. Ereren is a liar who fabricated the 
account of his accident and repeatedly perjured himself, there is record 
evidence - although it did not rise, to the jury's satisfaction, to the level of 
satisfactory corroboration of his account - supportive of his claim. His 
neurologist, Dr. Fares Elghazi (unfortunately, perhaps, for credibility purposes, 
a friend (R. 1413, Tr. 619) of Dr. Ereren), submitted an Affidavit (R. 708-10) 
and testified that Dr. Ereren told him, within two or three days of the incident 
(R. 1413, Tr. 621) that he was experiencing neck pain and dizziness as a result 
of his having recently been struck by a snowboarder while in a ski class at 
6 
Snowbird. R. 1413, Tr. 624-25. Dr. Elghazi also testified (R. 1413, Tr. 633, 
635) that the problems for which he treated Dr. Ereren were related to the 
trauma sustained in the ski accident and that Dr. Ereren had not told him of 
any other accident. Also, Dr. Robert Bray, Dr. Ereren's neurosurgeon, testified 
that the particular injury sustained by Dr. Ereren was rare and was completely 
consistent with the account given by Dr. Ereren. R. 1413, Tr. 576-79. There 
was no conflicting testimony. Also, Dr. Ereren picked his children up from the 
Snowbird day care center at 3:45 p.m. on March 9 th (R. 1412, Tr. 466, Ex. 4), 
earlier than the 4:00 p.m. time (R. 1412, Tr. 372) that the ski class ended, and 
received a credit (R. 1412, Tr. 466-68; Ex. 18) for returning his rental ski 
equipment earlier, as a result of his having been injured, than he had planned. 
Consider, also, Dr. Ereren's detailed account (R. 1412, Tr. 446-49) of his own 
efforts to locate "Dr. Scott," and his testimony (R. 1412, Tr. 444-45) that he 
had been "turning [his] house upside down trying to find" the business card of 
his ski instructor or her paramour. Also, Snowbird's Mr. Hoffman 
acknowledged, for what it's worth, and on whatever basis he acquired that 
understanding, that he understood that Dr. Ereren's skiing accident took place 
at Snowbird in a skiing accident in March of 1995. R. 1414, Tr. 762. 
It was erroneous for Judge Wilkinson to accept Snowbird's argument 
that Dr. Ereren's requests, or any of them,5 were not of the kinds contemplated 
5
 The requests need to be viewed independently of one another and, if the Court determines 
that Judge Wilkinson's ruling was incorrect with respect to any of them, even if correct with 
respect to others, this Court should reverse, given the fact that they all went to discovering 
critical corroborative evidence. 
7 
by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Snowbird's "invasion of 
privacy" argument clearly has no basis in the law (if it did, little, if any, 
information regarding any non-party witness would be discoverable). Nor, 
especially given the size of this case and the importance of finding 
corroborative evidence, were Dr. Ereren's subject requests overbroad or unduly 
burdensome. Also noteworthy is the fact that, if it really thought the March 1-
10, 1995 time period was too lengthy a period for producing information and 
documentation regarding its Florida-resident and physician guests, Snowbird 
never offered to produce the requested information or documentation for only, 
for example, March 8 th and 9 th. This Court should reverse and order a new 
trial for Snowbird's failure to provide the requested information and 
documentation and Judge Wilkinson's declining to compel Snowbird to 
produce such things, regardless of the Court's determination of the other 
aspects of this Appeal. 
B. SNOWBIRD HAS FAILED SATISFACTORILY TO COUNTER, 
BECAUSE IT CANNOT, DR. EREREN'S ARGUMENT THAT THE 
DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF 
DR. EREREN'S GAMBLING, BANKRUPTCY, AND SUPPOSED 
SHADY FINANCIAL REPORTING TO COME TO THE ATTENTION 
OF THE JURY. 
This Court should pierce Snowbird's protestations of innocence and, by 
reviewing the record in this case, as brought to the Court's attention in 
Dr. Ereren's Opening Brief, realize that Snowbird did not really have or pursue 
a defense against Dr. Ereren's damages case, in anything approaching a 
forthright fashion. The true reason for Snowbird's putting on evidence of 
Dr. Ereren's gambling and bankruptcy and of his supposedly improper use of 
8 
two sets of books was to have the jury doubt his credibility and think ill of his 
character. As explained in Dr. Ereren's Opening Brief at 24 and as the jury 
was instructed, the question of whether Dr. Ereren's business was "thriving* or 
whether he won or lost money gambling or whether he had or had not ever 
gone into bankruptcy6 had nothing to do with his damages claims. See, e.g., 
testimony of Dr. Paul Randle, Dr. Ereren's economic loss expert, R. 1413, Tr. 
688-89.7 The pertinent parts of Dr. Ereren's records were the Schedule Cs to 
his tax returns, which relate to the production of his business income. R. 
1413, Tr. 672. 
Snowbird was determined, in its desire to impugn Dr. Ereren's 
credibility, attack his character, and cause the jury to dislike him, to make him 
look as dirty as it could. Snowbird's naive or false contention, in its Brief at 
31, that the voir dire process necessarily successfully rooted out any prejudice 
against heavy gamblers or people who have filed bankruptcy or people who 
have discharged gambling and loan debts via bankruptcy manifests a basic 
misunderstanding or intentional understatement of the functional limitations 
of the voir dire process. If voir dire were always satisfactory in rooting out 
6
 Lest there be any uncertainty, Dr. Ereren did not seek the protection of the bankruptcy laws 
until 1997, some two years after his subject accident, and after his physical ability to perform 
surgeries had, by reason of his subject neck injury, diminished to almost nothing. For 
evidence pertaining to the occupational significance of his subject ski-incident injury, see, e.g., 
testimony of his neurosurgeon (R. 1413, Tr. 580-86) and his neurologist (R. 1413, Tr. 637-39). 
7
 One of the many misrepresentations and overstatements that plague Snowbird's Brief (for 
more examples, see part D (infra at 19-23) of this Argument) is its statement, at 28, that 
"Dr. Randle did admit that for a physician in private practice to be economically successful, he 
must also be a good businessman." (Emphasis added.) The Court should review the cited 
portion of the record (R. 1413, Tr. 704) to see what Dr. Randle really said. He simply 
acknowledged the truism that to be in private practice a physician had to be a businessman. 
9 
prospective jurors who might rule against a party based on things other than 
the pertinent evidence, there would be no purpose for motion in limine practice. 
The exercise of asking prospective jurors about their feelings regarding people 
who gamble and people who have filed for bankruptcy protection was 
something Dr. Ereren asked for, in the hope of minimizing the expected 
prejudicial effect of the evidence, only after Judge Livingston had denied his 
motions in limine regarding gambling and bankruptcy matters. The fact that 
Judge Livingston asked the prospective jurors about their feelings did not 
unring the bell that Judge Livingston had already determined, by his pre-trial 
rulings, would be rung. 
Snowbird's entire argument regarding the injection of gambling and 
bankruptcy into the trial of this case rests on the premise that those things 
were relevant to the damages issues in this case. As Dr. Ereren through his 
counsel sought unsuccessfully to explain to Judge Livingston in pre-trial 
proceedings, neither of those things truly had, as explained hereinabove and in 
Dr. Ereren's Opening Brief, anything to do with Dr. Ereren's damages. Nor did 
the testimony of Snowbird's Mr. Hoffman, including his discussion of 
Dr. Ereren's two sets of financial records, have anything truly to do with 
Dr. Ereren's damages. That was clearly extrinsic evidence prohibited by Rule 
608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.8 Never did Snowbird, through 
8
 Contrary to Snowbird's statement, at page 26 of its Brief, that Rule 608 pertains only to 
extrinsic evidence introduced solely for the purpose of impeaching a witness's credibility, Rule 
608(b) is not so limited. And the Court should keep in mind, as an indication of the true 
purpose of Snowbird's getting all the dirt it could into evidence, Snowbird's statement (R. 1023-
24), in its memorandum in opposition to the motion in limine that sought to keep such things 
10 
Mr. Hoffman's testimony or otherwise, logically link, because it could not do so, 
Dr. Ereren's gambling history, or his bankruptcy, or his use of two sets of 
books9 with any of the real damages issues. 
The unalterable fact is that it was Dr. Ereren's loss of ability to perform 
surgeries that caused him to sustain a severe loss of income and earning 
capacity. He had lost substantial sums gambling before his skiing accident, in 
years he still was able to earn several hundred thousand dollars a year 
performing surgeries, and he continued to gamble, for a period of time, after 
the occurrence of that accident. No one suggested that his ability to make 
money, which is what the law on income-related damages in Utah is all about 
and on which the jury was instructed, had anything to do with his gambling or 
bankruptcy or use of different sets of financial records. Even Snowbird's 
economist, Mr. Hoffman, who works "full-time doing lost profits valuations" (R. 
1414, Tr. 741), acknowledged (R. 1414, Tr. 766) that his analysis had nothing 
to do with Dr. Ereren's physical ability, or lack thereof, to perform surgeries 
any more. Snowbird somehow persuaded Judge Livingston of the relevance of 
out of evidence, that "[t]he core issue in this case is whether Dr. Ereren's testimony as to the 
incident is credible." (Emphasis added.) 
Also, the Court should keep in mind that Judge Livingston's ruling regarding 
Mr. Hoffman's Rule 608(b)-prohibited extrinsic evidence testimony and exhibits should be 
reviewed under a "correctness" standard, rather than an "abuse-of-discretion" standard. E.g., 
State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 704 (Utah App. 1993). 
9
 Responding to Snowbird's statement, at page 29 of its Brief, that "[i]t was an integral part of 
Mr. Hoffman's testimony to review Ereren's financial statements, whether they conflicted or 
not, and to explain which information he used in his analysis" (emphasis added), Dr. Ereren 
points out that a reading of that statement, as well as a reading of the portions of 
Mr. Hoffman's testimony there cited (R. 1414, Tr. 751-55), shows that, even if there was some 
conceivable relevance to Mr. Hoffman's testimony, generally, about Dr. Ereren's supposedly 
declining "business," there was absolutely no valid reason for bringing to the jury's attention 
the fact that there were any conflicting financial statements. 
11 
Dr. Ereren's gambling and bankruptcy history and of his use of different sets of 
books for supposedly improper purposes. This Court should understand that 
the subject evidence had nothing really to do with Dr. Ereren's damages and 
should not allow itself to be persuaded by Snowbird's argument to the 
contrary. 
Snowbird makes much, in its Brief at the top of page 29, of the 
proposition that Dr. Ereren's "business" was "declining under its debt burden." 
But Instructions Nos. 33 and 35, the income-related damages instructions -
and the law on which the jury was instructed (Snowbird sought no alternative 
instructions and stipulated to these instructions) - do not deal with the status 
of Dr. Ereren's "business," as opposed to what he had earned and could, but 
for the subject incident, have continued to earn, as a surgeon. Nor does the 
unpaid principal and interest on Dr. Ereren's practice loans have, contrary to 
Snowbird's suggestion, at page 28 of its Brief, anything to do with his income 
or earning capacity. 
Snowbird erroneously relies on the case of Dente v. Riddell, Inc., 664 
F.2d 1 (1 s t Cir. 1981), in support of its contention that Judge Livingston 
properly allowed evidence of Dr. Ereren's gambling. As Snowbird points out, at 
page 30 of its Brief, the plaintiff in Dente alleged that his social life had been 
ruined by the defendant's negligence. That and the eliciting of certain evidence 
at trial (id. at 3-5) caused the court in that case to determine that evidence of 
the plaintiffs gambling activities could appropriately be admitted. Dr. Ereren 
made no claim, in this case, that his social life had been ruined by Snowbird's 
12 
negligence. Nor did his counsel in any sense "open the door" to a discussion of 
gambling. Snowbird's reliance on the Dente case, in these circumstances, is 
indicative of the weakness of Snowbird's position. 
A case that is of considerable significance, in the event that this Court 
determines that there was any probative value whatsoever to any of the 
evidence at issue,10 is Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc., 992 P.2d 969 (Utah 
1999). There the Utah Supreme Court undertook a Rule 403 analysis to 
determine whether the prejudicial effect of evidence of the plaintiffs receipt of 
social security benefits substantially outweighed its probative value. In the 
absence of any actual showing of prejudice (something that Snowbird seems 
erroneously here to demand as a condition of reversal), the Supreme Court, 
observing that "[e]vidence that Robinson received disability benefits is 
potentially very prejudicial," and recognizing the slight probative value of the 
evidence (if there was any probative value to the evidence here at issue, it was, 
given its marginal, if any, relevance to Dr. Ereren's damages, similarly slight), 
ruled that the trial court should not have admitted that evidence. Id, at 975-
76. Evidence of heavy gambling, bankruptcy, discharge in bankruptcy of 
gambling and loan debts, and use of two sets of financial books is palpably at 
least as potentially prejudicial as was evidence of Mr. Robinson's receipt of 
disability benefits. 
10
 The Court does not need to reach this part of the analysis unless it determines, contrary to 
Dr. Ereren's primary contention, that any of the evidence in question was relevant. Also, if the 
Court accepts, as it should (see n. 8, at p. 10-11, supra), Dr. Ereren's contention that the 
question of the admissibility of Mr. Hoffman's extrinsic evidence testimony and exhibits should 
be governed by a "correctness" standard, the Court should not get to a Rule 403 weighing 
analysis, and should simply find legal error regarding that ruling. 
13 
Snowbird seeks to persuade this Court, at pages 33-36 of its Brief, that, 
assuming Judge Livingston abused his discretion in allowing evidence of 
Dr. Ereren's gambling, bankruptcy, and supposedly questionable financial 
reporting practices, Dr. Ereren cannot prevail on this part of the Appeal 
because he cannot show that any such evidentiary ruling was harmful. 
Snowbird attempts to convince this Court that there was such a supposed 
abundance of evidence supporting the jury's verdict and that this Court should 
determine that any abuse of discretion was harmless. 
First, Dr. Ereren points out that Snowbird conveniently neglects to 
mention, anywhere in its Brief, this Court's decision in Roundv v. Staley, 984 
P.2d 404 (Utah App. 1999), discussed at pages 1, 29, and 30 of Dr. Ereren's 
Opening Brief. In particular, Snowbird does not mention the following part of 
this Court's decision in Roundv: 
Staley argues that admission of Gunderson's testimony and the 
tape was harmless because this evidence was relevant only to the 
issue of damages - an issue the jury did not reach. However, a 
determination of liability in this case hinged on the parties' 
credibility. Because Staley introduced Gunderson's testimony in 
the tape to impeach Roundy's credibility, this evidence was directly 
relevant to the issue of liability. Furthermore the record reveals 
that this case largely hinged on Roundy's testimony versus 
Staley's. ... Therefore, if Roundy's testimony had not been 
impeached by admission of Gunderson's testimony and the tape, it 
is reasonably likely that the jury might have reached a different-
verdict. We therefore conclude the trial court's error in admitting 
Gunderson's testimony in the tape without prior disclosure was 
harmful. 
Id. at 409 (emphasis added). 
It is manifest, given the emphasized language from Roundv, that 
Snowbird is wrong in its contention, made at page 33 of its Brief, that 
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Dr. Ereren "must essentially marshal all of the other evidence supporting the 
verdict and demonstrate that all of the other evidence is not enough to 
maintain confidence in the jury's verdict." Roundv was a case, like virtually 
every case that is tried, in which other impeachment evidence and other 
evidence otherwise supporting the verdict was presented. This Court did not, 
however, in Roundv require the appellant to engage in any marshalling 
exercise, and there is no reason why this Court should require Dr. Ereren to do 
so as a condition of his being granted a new trial. 
In any event, the Court may consider it important for Dr. Ereren to 
respond to some of the particulars denominated a. through L, posited by 
Snowbird (at pages 33-36 of its Brief) as reasons why the jury could, 
independent of the evidence about Dr. Ereren's gambling history, bankruptcy, 
and supposed financial reporting shenanigans, correctly have found 
Dr. Ereren's account not credible. 
In response to item a., Dr. Ereren explains that he never claimed that the 
incident took place on March 8, 1995. The contention in the Complaint was on 
or about March 8 th. R. 2. Dr. Ereren, who hoped he would get better and not 
have to pursue a lawsuit, who put off undergoing surgery for more than two 
years after the incident, who refrained from instituting litigation for nearly four 
years after the incident, and who did not originally focus on the idea of suing 
anyone over the subject incident, cannot fairly be faulted for having had some 
initial uncertainty about the date of the incident. 
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Responding to item b., Dr. Ereren points out that not only Dr. Scott, but 
also Dr. Scott's wife and the ski instructor were present at the time the subject 
incident occurred. R. 1413, Tr. 462. 
Responding to item c , Dr. Ereren acknowledges that the evidence is that 
collisions are supposed to be reported but asks this Court to understand that it 
is certainly within the realm of human experience that the instructor in 
question may simply never have reported the subject incident because of her 
realization that she had made a mistake and her hope that Dr. Ereren had not 
been badly hurt. And see, e.g., testimony of Snowbird's ski instructor, Georgia 
Dumais (R. 1412, Tr. 344-45), for record support for the proposition that not 
all Snowbird ski instructors will necessarily follow established protocol. 
Responding to item d., Dr. Ereren explains, as he did at length in the 
summary judgment proceedings in this case (see, e.g., R. at 591; 596-98; 696-
97), that the reason he "changed his testimony" is that he, who had never been 
to Snowbird before his ill-fated trip in March of 1995, was not at all familiar 
with the subject terrain and that he based his initial testimony on a Snowbird 
map that did not show the cat track below which the ski instructor positioned 
him. He initially thought the incident must have happened just below 
Rothman Way because that is the only cat track shown on Snowbird's map in 
the general vicinity (Chip's Run) where the incident occurred. It was only after 
the taking of the deposition of Ronald Wolthuis, one of his planned trial 
witnesses; that Dr. Ereren and his counsel realized that the place that the 
Snowbird instructor had positioned him was farther down the mountain than 
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Rothman Way. See, also, R. at 856. This is no indication, although Snowbird 
tried to make it such, of Dr. Ereren's lack of credibility. 
Responding to item g., Dr. Ereren points out that he had made 
substantial progress in his days of skiing (R. 1413, Tr. 440, 443; 449-50) and 
that he was an experienced athlete and one who was used to physical contact 
(R. 1413, Tr. 450, 463). 
Responding to item h., Dr. Ereren points out that he still hoped he would 
get better a year after the accident, had not yet determined to sue Snowbird, 
and did not want to deny his family the opportunity of having an enjoyable 
experience. He did not ski when he took his family back. 
Responding to item i., Dr. Ereren acknowledges that the Snowbird 
instructors Snowbird put up as the only ones who could have fit the bill for the 
instructor in question testified as Snowbird says they testified; but it cannot be 
conclusively said that those were the only Snowbird instructors who taught 
that day. See the testimony of Steve Bills, Snowbird's ski school director. R. 
1412, Tr. 375-76. 
Responding to item j . , Dr. Ereren points out that he testified that, 
compared to his neck injury sustained in the subject incident, the tension-
related neck pain he had experienced prior to that time was insignificant and 
that it had ceased well prior to the time of the incident. R. 1413, Tr. 610-11. 
Responding to item 1., Dr. Ereren responds that the reason his wife did 
not testify was that the Ererens have two young children and she needed to 
stay home with them. They attended school. R. 1413, Tr. 479. She was, in 
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any event, not an eyewitness to the subject event. 
Dr. Ereren trusts that the Court will understand the significance, to the 
extent of undermining confidence in the jury's verdict (or, in the words of this 
Court in Roundv (984 P.2d at 409): "... it is reasonably likely the jury might 
have reached a different verdict"), of the wrongful and erroneous introduction 
of Dr. Ereren's gambling and bankruptcy history and of his different sets of 
financial records. This Court cannot say that the erroneous admission of the 
extrinsic evidence of the two sets of books or of Dr. Ereren's gambling and 
bankruptcy history did not work to undermine Dr. Ereren's credibility before 
the jury. This situation is very similar to the situation in Roundv (something 
Snowbird has not contested), and this Court should do what it did in Roundv 
and remand for a new trial. 
C. SNOWBIRD DISTORTS THE HISTORY OF THE CASE IN 
SUGGESTING THAT DR. EREREN WAS NOT SURPRISED BY 
THE TESTIMONY OF SNOWBIRD PERSONNEL REGARDING 
THE LACK OF JUMPING IN THE AREA OF THE SUBJECT 
INCIDENT. 
As mentioned hereinabove, at 16-17, in response to item d. of Snowbird's 
recitation of supposed facts supposedly undermining Dr. Ereren's credibility, 
Dr. Ereren was unable correctly to relate the scene of the subject incident to a 
particular Snowbird location until shortly before trial, when Mr. Wolthuis, who 
had traveled to the location pointed out by Dr. Ereren to his counsel, explained 
(R. 861-65; 856) that that location was not as far up the mountain as was the 
Rothman Way location. See, also, Dr. Ereren's Affidavit (R. 857-59). The 
deposition testimony of Snowbird personnel on which Snowbird at pages 39-41 
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of its Brief relies came about as a result of Dr. Ereren's erroneous identifica-
tion, caused by Snowbird's inaccurate map, of the location of the incident. 
Dr. Ereren and his counsel had no reason to believe that, once the 
correct area had been identified, Snowbird personnel would testify that that 
area was one not frequently, if ever, used for jumping. Snowbird's purported 
reliance on the depositions of Mr. Black and Ms. Durtschi, in which the 
questions dealt with the terrain in the immediate vicinity of Rothman Way, is 
disingenuous. Snowbird is well aware of the relevant history. The deposition 
testimony regarding non-jumping had nothing to do with the location 
presented at trial by Dr. Ereren as the location where the subject incident 
occurred, and Snowbird cannot fairly rely on deposition testimony dealing with 
a different location to contend that Dr. Ereren was not surprised by the trial 
testimony of the Snowbird witnesses. In this circumstance, Turner v. Nelson, 
872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994), is not directly dispositive. Although 
acknowledging that this is a closer question than the other issues he is 
pursuing in this Appeal, Dr. Ereren urges the Court to recognize that it was 
error, and, given the critical issues of credibility in this case, prejudicial error, 
for Judge Livingston to refuse to allow Dr. Ereren to call Mr. Gilchrist as a 
rebuttal witness. 
D. SNOWBIRD HAS MISSTATED AND OVERSTATED THE STATUS 
OF THE RECORD IN NUMEROUS PARTICULARS IN ADDITION 
TO THOSE DISCUSSED ABOVE. 
In its effort to uphold the jury verdict and judgment, Snowbird has 
misstated and overstated the record in various particulars in addition to those 
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specifically discussed above. In the interest of seeking to set the record 
straight, and at the risk of some repetition, Dr. Ereren points out the following 
examples of such inaccuracies: 
1. Responding to item 9 (set forth at page 8 of Snowbird's Brief) of 
Snowbird's "Statement of Facts," which contends that Dr. Ereren "changed his 
testimony to claim that the accident occurred in an entirely different location 
on the ski mountain" (emphasis added), Dr. Ereren invites the Court to take a 
look at the Snowbird map, reproduced at, among other places, R. 696. There 
is, on that map, perhaps an inch or two's distance between the original 
location, just below Rothman Way, and the location (near the intersection of 
Chip's Face and Chip's Run, just downhill from the Rothman Way location) 
regarding which Dr. Ereren testified at trial. 
2. Responding to item 13 of that "Statement of Facts," appearing on 
page 9, Dr. Ereren points out that Snowbird's Shirley Durtschi testified (R. 
1412, Tr. 336) that there are "several Lauras" at the ski school and 
acknowledged that she testified in her deposition that there was a young girl 
named Laura who taught "mostly children." R. 1412, Tr. 337. 
3. Responding to Snowbird's statement, in its "Summary of 
Argument," appearing at page 12 of its Brief, Dr. Ereren states that it is simply 
wrong for Snowbird to represent that he ever "refused to specify the date of the 
accident, the identities of any witnesses or even the location of the alleged 
accident." 
4. Responding to the last sentence of page 12 of Snowbird's Brief, 
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Dr. Ereren points out that there is no support whatsoever for the proposition 
that he testified that neither of the Snowbird ski instructors who testified at 
trial was the ski instructor who taught him because their testimony regarding 
the impossibility of the accident was too credible. 
5. Responding to the statement, appearing at page 17 of Snowbird's 
Brief, that the "identity of instructors employed as of March 8, 1995, is 
meaningless," Dr. Ereren points out that Snowbird itself has acknowledged, in 
item 10 of its "Statement of Facts," set forth at page 8 of its Brief, that 
Dr. Ereren skied with the same female ski instructor two days in a row. Also, 
both in his deposition testimony (R. 1415, Tr. 27-28) and in his trial testimony 
(R. 1412, Tr. 1441), Dr. Ereren testified that he skied with the same female ski 
instructor on the 8 th and 9 th of March. 
6. Responding to Snowbird's statement, at page 19 of its Brief, that 
Mr. Bills "speculated" that a document pertaining to people who purchased ski 
school tickets on March 9, 1995 had been found at one time but could not later 
be located, Dr. Ereren feels constrained to point out that Mr. Bills's testimony 
clearly rose above "speculation." R. 1412, Tr. 365. 
7. Responding to the Snowbird statement, made at page 19 of its 
Brief, that he made no effort to locate "Dr. Scott" until 2000 or the end of 1999, 
Dr. Ereren states that for years he did not know that Snowbird would question 
his account or that he would require corroborative testimony. It must be 
recalled that this litigation was not even initiated until December 1998. 
8. Responding to Snowbird's statement, at page 20 of its Brief, that a 
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Snowbird ski school "sales listing" document would not include any number, 
address, or other "identifying information" and that, accordingly, if the name of 
someone with a first name of Scott had shown up on that document, there 
would be nothing to designate him as the "Scott" with whom Dr. Ereren claims 
to have been skiing, it is important to understand that, with a last name, 
Dr. Ereren would, in today's information age, likely have been able to locate 
"Dr. Scott," and that, in any event, under the Rule of Askew v. Hardman, 
whether he could or could not in fact have located Dr. Scott is not outcome-
determinative on the issue. 
9. Responding to Snowbird's contention, at page 25 of its Brief, that 
once Dr. Ereren had obtained a loan for his practice he "actually took the 
money to Las Vegas and lost it gambling," Dr. Ereren states that Snowbird's 
record citation does not at all support that statement. Indeed, Dr. Ereren 
explained (R. 1413, Tr. 531) that the large sum he lost was lost over a 15-year 
period, not jus t after the loan was funded. 
10. Responding to Snowbird's statement, at page 25 of its Brief, that 
the hospital that Dr. Ereren had sued in a business dispute had countersued 
him for defaulting on another substantial practice loan, Dr. Ereren points out 
that the Court's review of the record cited by Snowbird will show that there is 
nothing there to support that contention. 
11. Responding to Snowbird's statement, at page 25 of its Brief, that 
Dr. Ereren's inability to pay back his practice debts, loan interests and 
attorney's fees, caused him to file for bankruptcy in 1997, Dr. Ereren points 
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out that a review of the record cited by Snowbird will show that there is no 
support for that statement. 
12. Responding to Snowbird's explanation, at page 27 of its Brief, of its 
counsel's determination not to argue damages, Dr. Ereren acknowledges that 
defense lawyers sometimes, for strategic purposes, do not argue damages, but 
points out that, especially given all the energy and resources that Snowbird put 
into its supposed damages defense, that explanation seems, in the particulars 
of this case, to be implausible. Also, Snowbird's reference to its counsel's 
"limited time" for closing argument seems disingenuous; a review of the record 
(R. 1414, Tr. 833-95) will cause the Court to recognize that Dr. Ereren's 
counsel took more than twice the time Snowbird's counsel took to deliver his 
closing argument. 
13. Responding to Snowbird's statement, at page 36 of its Brief, 
regarding "the invaluable opportunity the jury had to observe Ereren's evasive 
demeanor while testifying," Dr. Ereren responds that that is not the stuff of 
appellate review and that he takes vigorous issue with Snowbird's characteri-
zation of his demeanor. He, especially for one whose native language is not 
English, stepped up to the plate and answered questions as well as he could. 
E. IT IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR SNOWBIRD TO INTRODUCE, IN ITS 
ADDENDUM, LETTERS FROM ITS COUNSEL TO DR. EREREN'S 
COUNSEL THAT ARE NOT PART OF THE TRIAL RECORD. 
ALSO, THOSE LETTERS PRESENT AN INCOMPLETE AND 
MISLEADING PICTURE. 
Snowbird has inappropriately included in its Brief, as Addendum B, 
selected correspondence from its counsel to Dr. Ereren's counsel. It has not 
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included the other side of the correspondence, and almost all the 
correspondence it has included is not referenced to any part of the district 
court record. The letters give an incomplete and one-sided version of 
communications between counsel and attempt to slant things Snowbird's way. 
The Court should disregard the contents of Addendum B. 
If the Court thinks it appropriate to consider any of those materials, and, 
particularly, if the Court thinks there is any significance to the letter dated 
April 24, 2000, Dr. Ereren urges the Court to understand that he did not 
absolutely identify his ski instructor as being Andrea Martin. His Interrogatory 
answer and trial testimony (R. 1412, Tr. 443) was that, among the faces 
represented in that array, Ms. Martin11 seemed most to resemble the ski 
instructor in question. Dr. Ereren also points out that it is most unlikely, 
contrary to the letter of November 15, 2000, from Snowbird's counsel to 
Dr. Ereren's counsel, that Snowbird had no identifying information (address, 
phone number, or contact person) in addition to what is set forth on the 
computer printout attached to that letter. More importantly, Snowbird's giving 
of the names of organizations putting on seminars was not a sufficient 
response to Dr. Ereren's discovery requests geared toward learning the identity 
of Dr. Scott. 
m. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis and that set forth in his Opening Brief, 
11
 Lest the Court wonder what became of the Andrea Martin aspect of this case: Snowbird 
submitted an Affidavit from Ms. Martin (R. 352-53) attesting to the fact that she was not the 
instructor in question. 
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Dr. Ereren urges the Court to reverse Judge Wilkinson's denial of Dr. Ereren's 
Motion to Compel, to order Snowbird to provide the requested information and 
documentation (which Snowbird still does not deny having), to reverse Judge 
Livingston's rulings on the motions in limine regarding gambling, bankruptcy, 
and financial reporting, to reverse Judge Livingston's ruling regarding 
Dr. Ereren's desired calling of a rebuttal witness, and to remand for a new trial. 
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